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Competition and regulation in a
di¤erentiated good market
Ra¤aele Fioccoy
Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of how to design the institutional
structure of an industry which provides two di¤erentiated products.
One good is supplied by a regulated monopoly and the other is pro-
duced in a competitive (unregulated) segment. Two possible insti-
tutional patterns are compared. Under "concentration" the regulated
rm can enter the competitive segment by owning one rm which oper-
ates there (even though the two rms must be legally unbundled). The
regime of "separation" implies that regulated activities are totally un-
bundled from the unregulated ones, that is, common ownership is not
allowed. When the regulator does not know the regulated monopolys
cost of production, we nd that the pattern of separation improves
(expected) social welfare as long as goods are substitutes. Conversely,
concentration performs better in case of complementarity.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays competition and regulation often take place simultaneously in hor-
izontally related markets, where goods may exhibit some degree of substi-
tutability or complementarity. This is mainly a consequence of both impor-
tant technological advancements and intense deregulation, which occur at a
di¤erent pace in di¤erent sectors. Regulated rms are sometimes allowed
to operate in competitive segments. Local telephone untertakings such as
regional Bell companies in the US provide unregulated broadband internet
services. The utility Pepco also o¤ers energy management services. In Eu-
rope GDF Suez, RWE and Enel all operate in regulated as well as unregu-
lated markets in energy, water and other utility sectors. A further prominent
example is Deutsche Post, which acts as a regulated monopoly in the distri-
bution of all letters below a certain weight and competes as a logistic group
integrated with DHL and Postbank in the liberalized market for the man-
agement and transportation of goods, information and payments. In most
these cases legal unbundling is required, which implies that the regulated and
competitive activities are run by separate rms with their own accounts but
common ownership is allowed.
Regulatory institutions have raised some concerns about this horizontal
expansion and have sometimes prevented regulated rms from exerting ac-
tivities in competitive markets. This was for instance the case of the regional
Bell companies, which had been prohibited from expanding into the unregu-
lated long-distance services. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed
this interdiction but it required these activities to be legally separated.1 How-
ever, these companies are still not permitted to manufacture equipment.
Whether to allow a regulated rm to enter a liberalized market and how
to design regulation in this case are issues of practical and theoretical rele-
vance. There are well-known objections to horizontal diversication such as
the fear that rms expansion may distort competition in the unregulated
sector (the "level playing eld" argument). Conversely, it is well established
in the economic literature that rms diversication may yield e¢ ciency gains
(economies of scope, also known as "synergies") which can benet consumers.
In this paper we introduce a di¤erent element which can play a role in
the policy debate on horizontal diversication: the di¤erentiation between
regulated and unregulated goods. The aforementioned examples show that
regulated rms tend to expand into related sectors, whose goods may exhibit
a relation of substitutability or complementarity with the commodity sold in
1This requirement, which has been recently abandoned, was included in the Section
272 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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the regulated market. To this end we consider a two di¤erentiated product
industry where one good is regulated and the other is o¤ered in a compet-
itive way. In the European utility sector, the former may be the electricity
provided in the regulated market and the latter may represent the energy
sold in the free market (substitute) or energy management services (comple-
ment). In a setting of regulatory optimal control, two possible institutional
structures are compared: the regime of concentration, where the regulated
monopoly is allowed to engage in the competitive segment by owning one
rm which operates there, and that of separation, which prescribes that reg-
ulated and competitive activities must be totally unbundled. In line with
some practical evidence, we assume that even in the rst case the regula-
tor imposes a kind of unbundling and prescribes legal separation between
the two entities, which must have their own accounts even though common
ownership is permitted.
As Dana [1993] emphasizes, the problem of choosing the suitable orga-
nizational structure cannot be disentangled from the design of the optimal
regulatory policy when the regulator has limited knowledge of the industry.
This is because the organizational structure crucially a¤ects the informa-
tional costs of policy implementation. Hence, the investigation of this inter-
action allows the regulator to acquire a valuable instrument to improve the
performance of regulation.
When the regulator cannot observe the regulated rms cost of produc-
tion, our model predicts that the pattern of separation improves (expected)
social welfare in case of substitutability between goods. The idea is that
the regime of consolidation exacerbates the monopolys incentives to raise
costs since this strategy is also protable in the competitive segment. Cost
exaggeration has a positive informational externality on the unregulated af-
liate which produces (and earns) more when goods are substitutes. This
aggravates the regulators critical control problem since the social costs of
policy implementation increase. For su¢ ciently high levels of substitutabil-
ity, the regulator must even abandon its desire to discriminate between the
rms types and can only o¤er a bunching mechanism. Under separation
the regulator nds it easier to incentivize the regulated rm, which does not
internalize the e¤ect of its strategic behaviour on the competitive market.
Concentration performs better if goods are complements. The rms
strategy to inate costs, which is as usual benecial in the regulated seg-
ment, now penalizes the competitive subsidiary, whose quantity (and prot)
decreases (in expected value). We nd that countervailing incentives emerge,
which relax the regulators problem since the monopolys interest in cost ma-
nipulation is weaker. For su¢ ciently high levels of complementarity, the reg-
ulator is even able to extract all informational rents despite the asymmetric
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information problem.
Our analysis suggests that demand interdependence between regulated
and unregulated markets deserves careful consideration from policy makers
when deciding whether to allow a regulated rm to expand into competitive
activities. Even though it is only a particular aspect of a number of important
considerations which warrant a close study in any complete analysis of the
topic, we believe that this element yields an additional relevant trade-o¤
which is worth per se investigating.
2. Related literature
The main part of the early literature on horizontal diversication of regulated
rms (see, among others, Braeutigam and Panzar [1989]) emphasizes the risk
of excessive expansion into unregulated markets if rms are able to engage in
cost shifting, which occurs when the regulator counts as costs for regulated
services those arising solely from unregulated activities. However, Anton and
Gertler [1988] demonstrate that regulators can use the prot opportunities
created by "external" (unregulated) markets to insulate the "internal" (reg-
ulated) markets from quantity distortions which arise in environments with
asymmetric information. A necessary condition for insulation is that mar-
ginal costs vary with output levels, thus providing a cost linkage between the
two markets.
Lewis and Sappington [1989a] study a model where the costs of regu-
lated activities are positively correlated with protability in the unregulated
sector. They show that the rms incentive to exaggerate costs in the reg-
ulated market will be mitigated because such an overstatement implies a
claim that participation in the unregulated market is more protable than it
really is. Put di¤erently, allowing the regulator to expand into the compet-
itive segment generates "countervailing incentives" (Lewis and Sappington
[1989b]) which alleviate the regulatory task of controlling cost exaggeration.
They depend on the black-box description of protability in the competitive
market. We also nd that countervailing incentives may operate when the
regulated rm diversies but in our paper these forces are driven by demand
interdependence between markets.
More recently, Sappington [2003] has shown that diversication is unde-
sirable if the regulator cannot control e¤ort diversion to unregulated services
and the rm exaggerates costs. In Calzolari and Scarpa [2009] a regulated do-
mestic rm also operates in an unregulated foreign market. Although rms
expansion amplies the distortions due to asymmetric information, home
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consumers are better o¤ when costs exhibit economies of scale.2
The role of cost interdependence between regulated and unregulated mar-
kets has then been carefully studied in the literature. In this paper we focus
our attention on a di¤erent aspect which proves to be of some relevance to
the regulatory policy in case of horizontal expansion: the interdependence
between markets on the demand side.
A handful of relevant papers analyzes the e¤ects of asymmetric informa-
tion on the optimal organizational structure in a multiproduct industry with
interdependent demands.3 Baron and Besanko [1992] investigate how a reg-
ulator should organize a production activity in which di¤erent units produce
components (which are perfect complements) and each of them has private
information about its costs. They show that contracting with a single rm
which controls both components of production makes the regulator better
o¤ than having one independent producer for each component. The idea is
that the suppliers are disciplined by threatening to terminate their operation
if total reported cost is too high. Termination reduces the prot that can
be generated on both units. Integrated production allows the regulator to
save rents because a single rm fully internalizes the impact that an over-
statement of each units costs has on the output and the prot of the other.
Gilbert and Riordan [1995] nd essentially the same results, by focusing on
the case of inelastic demand.
Our paper asks the similar question of how to organize the institutional
pattern in a multiproduct industry in a more general setting where goods are
either substitutes or complements.4 This is in line with the analysis in Iossa
[1999], who shows that a regulator which has imperfect information about
the state of demand may achieve a better performance through integration
of production if goods are substitutes, while decentralization tends to be
preferred in case of complementarity. Notice that we nd completely reverse
results in presence of regulatory limited knowledge about production costs.
The kind of asymmetric information in hand clearly a¤ects the design of
industry structure. Severinov [2003] shows that under complementarity or
2In a companion paper [2011] Calzolari and Scarpa consider a regulated rm which is
active in other unregulated sectors of the same country, and joint conduct of activities
generates economies of scope that are rms private information. They show that even
though this creates distortions in the optimal regulation, allowing the rm to integrate is
(socially) desirable.
3For a review on this topic see Armstrong and Sappington [2007].
4Gilbert and Riordan recognize that perfect complementarity is a quite special case
when they point out that our analysis also depends on the assumption of a xed-
proportions production technology for the nal good. This is perhaps questionable even
in the electricity example, because optimizing the transmission grid may reduce the need
for new generation capacity [1995, p. 252].
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small degree of substitutability the value for the producers of using two pieces
of information together is lower than the sum of values of each piece of
information used independently. Since the interests of producers are opposite
to those of the regulator, the latter prefers centralization. The reverse occurs
for su¢ ciently high levels of substitutability.
All papers mentioned so far presume that markets are totally regulated.
As Iossa points out [1999, p. 213]
However, regulated rms often interact with unregulated
rivals and this interaction plays a crucial role in the contrac-
tual relationship between the regulator and the regulated rm.
Consequently a next step could be to consider situations where
regulated and unregulated rms compete .
To our knowledge, no model examining the design of institutional pattern
in a di¤erentiated good market takes this aspect into account. Our aim is to
seek to ll this gap and consider a setup where only a part of the industry
is regulated, while competition in the market occurs in the other part. We
believe that this better ts the features of modern integrated markets, where
regulated activities often interact with the competitive supply of di¤erenti-
ated products. Within this setting we compare two institutional patterns:
the regime of consolidation, where the regulated rm can enter the com-
petitive segment by owning one enterprise which operates there, and that of
separation, where there is full unbundling between regulated and competitive
activities.
Our contribution is also related to the literature on the institutional de-
sign in vertically related markets (see Vickers [1995]). In line with some em-
pirical evidence, this literature has recently considered the presence of legal
unbundling. Sibley and Weisman [1998] and Cremer et al. [2006] have intro-
duced the idea that the subsidiary independently maximizes its own prots,
while the parent company cares about joint prots. Very recently, Hö­ er
and Kranz [2011] have suggested that legal unbundling can be a "golden
mean" between ownership separation and full vertical integration. We follow
the common approach in these papers, which presume that legal unbundling
works perfectly in separating the interests of the a¢ liate from the rest of the
integrated group.5
5As Hö­ er and Kranz [2011, p. 579] recognize, this does not always reect the prac-
tice of legal unbundling. However, legislation in Europe and in the US often explicitly
excludes direct instructions of the parent company or prescribes arms length relations.
Other requirements may help to implement more severely legal unbundling, like strict per-
sonnel separation which ensures that professional interests of the subsidiarys employees
are separated from those of the parent company.
6
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the basic
structures of the model. In Section 4 we consider the case of regulation
under complete information, where the two institutional structures turn out
to be equivalent. Section 5 derives the regulatory outcome with asymmetric
cost information. In Section 6 we make welfare comparisons between the
two regimes. Finally, Section 7 is devoted to some concluding remarks. All
relevant proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
3. The model
The setting under consideration is a di¤erentiated good market with two com-
modities, which can be either substitutes or complements. The production
of one good is regulated. The other good is provided in a competitive way.
Two institutional patterns are compared: the regime of consolidation, where
the regulated monopoly owns one competitive rm, and that of separation,
under which regulated and competitive activities are completely unbundled.
Following Singh and Vives [1984], the consumersgross utility from the
marketplace is represented by a quadratic utility function of the form
U (qr; qu) = qr + qu   1
2
 
q2r + 2qrqu + q
2
u

, (1)
where qr denotes the quantity for the regulated good and qu represents the
quantity for the good provided in the unregulated (competitive) segment.
Moreover, ,  are positive parameters, and jj <  captures the degree
of product di¤erentiation with  2 (0; ) if goods are substitutes and  2
( ; 0) if they are complements. For  = 0, the two markets are perfectly
independent.
The consumer surplus net of expenditures on goods is given by
CS (qr; qu) = U (qr; qu)  prqr   puqu. (2)
The inverse demand function pi (qi; qj) for good i, with i; j = r; u, i 6= j, is
thus
pi (qi; qj) =   qi   qj. (3)
A benevolent regulator maximizes social welfare, which is dened as
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W (qr; qu; Sr) = CS (qr; qu)  Sr, (4)
i.e. consumer surplus in (2) net of subsidies Sr received by the monopoly via
the regulatory process (see below).6
Notice that (4) is a social welfare function à la Baron and Myerson [1982]
with zero weights on prots. The choice of this function is not crucial for the
results we obtain. As Armstrong and Sappington [2007] emphasize, we can
neglect without any loss of generality the shadow cost of public funds à la
La¤ont and Tirole [1986] arising from distortionary taxation, which increases
even more the weight of taxpayer welfare in the social welfare function and
makes the analysis less transparent without a¤ecting qualitatively the results.
Interestingly enough, our formulation also allows to interpret Sr as the xed
payment of a two-part tari¤. Finally, a positive weight on prot in (4) would
not change the relevant trade-o¤s, the only di¤erence being that the higher
regulatory concern about prots clearly creates lower quantity distortions
and higher prots.
The regulated rms prot is
r (qr; qu; Sr; cr) = pr (qr; qu) qr   crqr + Sr, (5)
which is the revenue from the marketplace plus subsidies.7
Two rms operate in the competitive segment with respective prots
1u
 
q1u; qu; qr; c
1
u

= pu (qr; qu) q
1
u   c1uq1u (6)
2u
 
q2u; qu; qr; c
2
u

= pu (qr; qu) q
2
u   c2uq2u, (7)
where qu  q1u + q2u. The two rms compete on prices (à la Bertrand) and
exhibit di¤erent costs. Without loss of generality rm 1 is more e¢ cient
than rm 2, i.e. cu  c2u   c1u > 0. As stressed in Section 1, competition in
6Notice that the regulator cares about welfare generated in the entire market, even
though it is not allowed to control the competitive part. The idea is that the deregula-
tion process may imply the loss of some regulatory instruments but does not a¤ect the
regulatory concern about the aggregate welfare. This is particularly true if one indivisible
market for di¤erentiated goods is involved.
7Possible xed costs which make the activity naturally monopolistic are irrelevant for
our analysis and then ignored without any loss of generality.
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markets connected with the regulated ones is often the result of a deregula-
tion process. Hence, the competitive market can be thought of as a segment
where a single rm still operates (rm 1, see Section 4) but the removal
of entry barriers and consequential deregulation allow a rival (or competi-
tive fringe, rm 2) to exert (potential) competitive pressure.8 Interestingly
enough, our results are not crucially driven by the assumption of strategic
complementarity, that is, price competition. In the Appendix we show that
the main conclusions remain valid if we consider strategic substitutability in
the unregulated market, that is, quantity (Cournot) competition.
Under concentration the monopoly owns rm 1 and is entitled to receive
its prots. As discussed in Section 2, this implies that it cares about joint
prots, while the competitive subsidiary maximizes its own prots.
Notice from (5), (6) and (7) that we do not consider economies of scope or
any other cost linkage between markets. Put di¤erently, the two institutional
patterns we investigate are equivalent in terms of productive e¢ ciency. In
line with the main literature which is relevant for our purposes (see Iossa
[1999]), this allows to focus on the role played by the interdependence of
demands.
4. Complete information
To better appreciate how our main results are driven by asymmetric cost
information we start with the case of a fully informed regulator. Under
complete information the two institutional patterns yield exactly the same
outcome: the regulated monopoly has no degree of freedom and then the
(possibly) di¤erent strategic behaviours induced by the two organizational
structures are inconsequential.
Our model is a two-stage game. After choosing the institutional pattern,
at the rst stage the regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a policy
fqr; Srg to the regulated rm, which accepts or refuses the o¤er. In case of
rejection, the rm obtains its reservation utility (normalized to zero). At the
8The more e¢ cient rm may be the former monopolist. There are good reasons for
thinking that this is the case, like the longer experience of the incumbent in running the
activity. For our purposes it is however su¢ cient that any one competing rm turns out to
be more e¢ cient than the others, otherwise price competition implies zero prots for any
rm and the monopolys expansion into the unregulated sector does not change its prots
(and incentives). Imperfect competition which allows room for prots seems to be a natural
assumption in markets which have been recently liberalized. The decision to deregulate is
in line with empirical evidence (see Section 1) and it can stem from a number of sensible
reasons (like the policy makersdesire to promote competition in segments which are not
natural monopolies), whose analysis is outside the scope of this paper.
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second stage, two rms compete in the unregulated market.
We solve this game by backward induction. At the second stage, using (6)
and (7) Bertrand competition implies that the equilibrium price is (almost)
equal to the marginal cost of (ine¢ cient) rm 2, i.e. pu = c2u,
9 and (e¢ cient)
rm 1 will serve all the market, i.e. q1u = qu, with
qu (qr) =
1

 
  c2u   qr

(8)
by (3). Notice that when goods are substitutes ( > 0) a trade-o¤ emerges in
their consumption (dqu
dqr
< 0), while complementarity ( < 0) implies a benet
in their joint consumption (dqu
dqr
> 0). Hereafter we denote by u = 1u the
prot of rm 1, which is the unique rm indeed operating in the unregulated
market.10
At the rst stage the regulator designs a policy fqr; Srg, which species
the quantity qr and the subsidy Sr for the regulated rm in order to maximize
social welfare dened in (4). We replace the choice variable Sr in (5) with
r given their bijective correspondence in the monopolys prot function for
a given qr. Using (5) and the second-stage outcome in (8), the regulators
problem in (4) becomes
max
fqr;rg
qr   crqr   1
2
q2r +
1
2
 
  c2u   qr
2   r s:t: r  0, (9)
where the constraint ensures the participation of the regulated rm, which
receives a non-negative utility level from the regulatory relationship.11
Standard calculations lead to the following conclusion.
9There is a very minor technical detail here, since at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
rm 2 charges a price equal to its marginal cost and rm 1 a price which is a shade !
below it. Of course rm 1 wants to choose ! as close as possible to zero, but for any given
small number ! it is always possible to nd another number smaller than it. To solve this
technical problem we use an escamotage which is common in the literature, by assuming
that for identical prices all the demand goes to the rm with lower costs.
10We assume that, despite its cost advantage, rm 1 cannot set a monopoly price (see
Appendix B). Otherwise, rm 2 would be completely irrelevant, and the e¤ect of (potential)
competition in the market would disappear.
11Under consolidation the original participation constraint is r + u  0. In line with
some relevant literature (see Iossa [1999]), we restrict our attention to the ex ante case
where the institutional pattern cannot be made dependent on the particular characteristics
of the rm. This still allows the regulator to prohibit the rm from consolidating if it rejects
the contract, so that its outside option is zero. Moreover, because of legal separation, each
branch of the consolidated group must be viable per se when operating in the market (for
instance because cross subsidization is not allowed), which implies r  0.
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Lemma 1 Under complete information, the regimes of consolidation and
separation yield the same outcome, which exhibits the following properties
qr =
  cr   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) (10 )
pr = cr (11 )
r = 0 (12 )
qu =
  c2u   z (  cr)
 (1  z2) (13 )
pu = c
2
u, (14 )
where z  

2 ( 1; 1).
The quantities for the two goods in (10) and (13) are interdependent
through the parameter z, which captures the relative degree of substitutabil-
ity (z > 0) or complementarity (z < 0). Notice from (14) that the unregu-
lated rm produces at a price above its marginal costs c1u, which arises from
competition and cannot be directly a¤ected by regulation. The marginal cost
pricing outcome in the regulated market (see (11)) reveals that the regulator
nds it too costly to reduce allocative ine¢ ciency in the competitive segment
by distorting the regulated price away from marginal cost. It prefers to tol-
erate this social cost and maximize allocative e¢ ciency in the regulated part
of the industry while the monopoly is given zero prots (see 12)).
5. The case of asymmetric information
The result of equivalence of the institutional structure emphasized in Lemma
1 breaks down as long as the regulator is no longer omniscient. We now
assume that it does not know the cost cr of producing the regulated good.12
12Asymmetric information concerns only the regulated part of the industry. The com-
petitive supply of a homogeneous good should allow the regulator to acquire quite easily
all widespread information. More relevantly, our results do not change signicantly if
costs in the two markets are unknown and independently distributed, when the consol-
idated rm does not know its a¢ liates costs, as we expect with legal separation which
usually prescribes a system of "Chinese walls" against the exchange of information within
the group (the main di¤erence being that the rm takes the expected competitive prots
into account). As the choice of the institutional pattern does not a¤ect competition in
the unregulated market, when costs are (su¢ ciently highly) correlated the regulator can
achieve the complete information result under the two regimes by implementing a mech-
anism of "yardstick competition" which conditions the subsidy to the regulated rm on
the outcome at the second stage.
11
For the sake of convenience, this cost can only take two possible values, that
is, cr 2 fc r ; c+r g, with (common knowledge) probabilities  and (1  ) 2
(0; 1) respectively, and cr  c+r   c r > 0.
The sequence of events is the following.
(I) The regulator chooses the institutional pattern.
(II) Nature draws a type cr 2 fc r ; c+r g for the rm and privately informs
the rm.
(III) Invoking revelation principle (Myerson [1979]), the regulator makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er fqr (bcr) ; Sr (bcr)g, which species the quantity qr (:)
and the subsidy Sr (:) as functions of the regulated rms report bcr 2 fc r ; c+r g,
such that bcr = cr in equilibrium. The rm accepts or refuses the o¤er. In
case of rejection, the rm obtains its reservation utility (normalized to zero).
(IV) Two rms compete in the unregulated segment.
Let us analyze now the regulatory game under the two alternative insti-
tutional patterns.
5.1. The regime of separation
The presence of asymmetric cost information allows the monopoly to exploit
strategically its informative advantage. The economic literature has long
ago emphasized that the rm has a natural incentive to overstate its costs
in order to obtain a higher price and then a larger prot. This conclusion
denitely applies to the pattern of separation.13
As the second-stage outcome is unchanged, the regulators problem at the
rst stage is the maximization of (9) in expected terms. Formally, we have
max
f(qr(c r );r(c r ));(qr(c+r );r(c+r ))g


qr
 
c r
  c r qr  c r   12q2r  c r 
+
1
2
 
  c2u   qr
 
c r
2   r  c r + (1  ) qr  c+r   c+r qr  c+r 
 1
2
q2r
 
c+r

+
1
2
 
  c2u   qr
 
c+r
2   r  c+r  s:t: (15)
13An e¢ cient rm which claims to be ine¢ cient, by declaring bcr = c+r instead of c r ,
gets a positive prot, i.e. from (5) r (c+r ; c
 
r ) = r (c
+
r )+crqr (c
+
r ) > 0, as r (c
+
r ) = 0 if
the regulator attempts to implement the complete information policy. Conversely, under-
stating costs is self-defeating, since r (c r ; c
+
r ) = r (c
 
r ) crqr (c r ) < 0, as r (c r ) = 0.
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r
 
c r
  0 (16)
r
 
c+r
  0 (17)
r
 
c r
  r  c+r ; c r  = r  c+r +crqr  c+r  (18)
r
 
c+r
  r  c r ; c+r  = r  c r  crqr  c r  , (19)
where (16) and (17) are the participation constraints for the two types c r
and c+r of the rm, while (18) and (19) represent their respective incentive
compatibility constraints. Clearly, each type of the rm must receive at least
what it would get by mimicking the other.14
The following Proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 1 Under asymmmetric information, the regime of separation
yields
qSr (cr) =
8>><>>:
 c r  z( c2u)
(1 z2)
 c+r  z( c2u)
(1 z2)   cr(1 z2)
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(20 )
pSr (cr) =
8<:
c r
c+r + cr
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(21 )
Sr (cr) =
8><>:
 c+r  z( c2u) cr
(1 z2) cr
0
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(22 )
qSu (cr) =
8>><>>:
 cu2 z( c r )
(1 z2)
 cu2 z( c+r )
(1 z2) +
zcr
(1 z2)
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(23 )
where   
1  .
14The right-hand side in (18) and (19) is derived using (5), see also the previous footnote.
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Standard forces operate here.15 The c r -rms production in (20) is rst-
best optimal ("no distortion at the top" result), and the corresponding price
in (21) equals marginal costs. Clearly, the competitive output in (23) is af-
fected by asymmetric information, neither. The regulated quantity in (20)
of the ine¢ cient rm is downward distorted - and the corresponding price
in (21) is set above marginal costs - in order to curb the informational rent
in (22) extracted by the e¢ cient rm. The competitive output in (23) re-
acts according to the sign of product di¤erentiation, and thus it increases
(decreases) when goods are substitutes (complements) with respect to the
complete information outcome.
5.2. The regime of consolidation
Under consolidation the regulated rm internalizes the prots of its a¢ liate
in the unregulated market. This might a¤ect the natural sign of incentives
to manipulate information. The following Lemma guarantees that this is not
the case.
Lemma 2 If the regulator implements the complete information policy de-
spite the problem of asymmetric information, the regulated rm has only an
incentive to exaggerate costs.
The regime of consolidation does not distort the usual direction of mis-
reporting costs. The e¢ cient monopoly still pretends to be ine¢ cient. Con-
versely, the high-cost rm does not nd it convenient to understate its infor-
mation.
However, the internalization of its subsidiarys prots crucially a¤ects the
strategic behaviour of the regulated rm. Incentive compatibility constraints
are now written as
r
 
c r

+ u
 
c r
  r  c+r ; c r + u  c+r ; c r  (24)
r
 
c+r

+ u
 
c+r
  r  c r ; c+r + u  c r ; c+r  . (25)
The regulator designs a policy which guarantees to the rm higher joint
prots from truth-telling. This means that the overall prot from reveal-
ing its own type (left-hand side of (24) and (25)) outweighs the gain from
manipulating information (right-hand side of (24) and (25)).
15For an analysis of the impact of asymmetric information on the optimal regulatory
policy in a single market, see the seminal paper of Baron and Myerson [1982].
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Substituting (8) into u (:), (24) and (25) become after some manipula-
tions
r
 
c r
  r  c+r +crqr  c+r + zcu  qr  c r   qr  c+r  (26)
r
 
c+r
  r  c r  crqr  c r   zcu  qr  c r   qr  c+r  . (27)
Summing (26) and (27) yields the following monotonicity constraint (also
called implementability condition16)
qr
 
c r
  qr  c+r  , (28)
which clearly states that the production level requested from the c r -rm
cannot be lower than the one requested from the c+r -rm.
5.2.1. Substitutes
The following Proposition emphasizes the main results under substitutability,
which are investigated step by step.
Proposition 2 Under asymmmetric information, if z 2 [0; zs ], with zs 
cr
cu
> 0, then the regime of consolidation yields
qCr (cr) =
8>><>>:
 c r  z( c2u)
(1 z2)   zcu(1 z2)
 c+r  z( c2u)
(1 z2)   cr zcu(1 z2)
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(29 )
pCr (cr) =
8<:
c r + zc
u
c+r +  (cr   zcu)
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(30 )
Cr (cr) =
8><>:
 c+r  z( c2u) cr+(1+2)zcu
(1 z2) cr   (1+)z
2(cu)
2
(1 z2)
0
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(31 )
16See La¤ont and Martimort [2002, ch. 2].
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qCu (cr) =
8>><>>:
 cu2 z( c r )
(1 z2) +
z2cu
(1 z2)
 cu2 z( c+r )
(1 z2) + z
cr zcu
(1 z2)
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r .
(32 )
If z 2 (zs ; 1) then the regulatory mechanism exhibits the following prop-
erties
qCr =
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) (33 )
pCr = c
+
r (34 )
Cr (cr) =
8><>:
 c+r  z( c2u)
(1 z2) cr
0
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(35 )
qCu =
  cu2   z (  c+r )
 (1  z2) . (36 )
Proposition 2 emphasizes that the regulator nds it optimal to o¤er a
screening contract only if substitutability between goods is su¢ ciently low,
i.e. z 2 [0; zs ]. Interestingly enough, the production of the e¢ cient rm in
(29) is downward distorted, and the corresponding price in (30) is set above
marginal costs. The c+r -rm is also allowed to produce less than under com-
plete information (the second addend in (29) is non-negative if z 2 [0; zs ])
and then the price is distorted above marginal costs (see (30)). More rel-
evantly, this distortion is softer than under separation (compare (20) and
(29) or equivalently (21) and (30)). The idea is that under consolidation
the regulator reduces the wedge between quantities which ensures incentive
compatibility (see (28)) in order to relax the relevant constraint in (26) and
then curb informational rents in (31) extracted by the e¢ cient rm. The
unregulated output in (32) increases due to substitutability between goods
and then the competitive branch of the consolidated group is more protable.
If goods are su¢ ciently close substitutes, i.e. z 2 (zs ; 1), then the sep-
arating equilibrium characterized in the rst period of Proposition 2 is no
longer implementable.17 The rationale is that the regulators desire would
be to have the ine¢ cient rm producing more than the e¢ cient one in order
17Notice that the interval (zs ; 1) where the bunching solution applies is nonempty for
cr < cu, that is, when the spread between costs in the regulated segment is lower than
the cost asymmetry in the competitive part of the market. For higher values of cr the
regulator is always able to discriminate between the rms types without violating the
monotonicity condition.
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to limit the high informational rents of the latter (see (26)). However, this
strategy is not feasible because it violates the monotonicity condition in (28).
The only option available to the regulator is then to implement the bunching
mechanism described in the second period of Proposition 2. Both types of
the rm produce the same quantity in (33) at a price equal to the cost of the
ine¢ cient rm (see (34)). This allows to the c r -rm to receive the informa-
tional rent given by (35), while the competitive a¢ liate of the consolidated
group produces the quantity in (36).
5.2.2. Complements
The following Proposition shows our results in case of complementarity.
Proposition 3 Dene zc < 0 as the (unique) value for z such that
 (z)   z
2 (cu)
2
cr
(1 + )+(1 + 2) zcu+ c+r  z
 
  c2u
 cr = 0.
(37 )
Then, under asymmetric information, if z 2 [zc ; 0) the regulatory mech-
anism with consolidation exhibits the same features as if z 2 [0; zs ], i.e. it is
dened by (29) through (32) in the rst period of Proposition 2.
If z 2 ( 1; zc ), the regime of consolidation yields
eqCr (cr) =
8>><>>:
 c r  z( c2u)
(1 z2)   zcu(1 z2)"
 c+r  z( c2u)
(1 z2)   cr zcu(1 )(1 z2)"
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(38 )
epCr (cr) =
8<:
c r +
zcu

"
c+r +
cr zcu
1  "
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(39 )
eCr (cr) =
8<:
0
0
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(40 )
eqCu (cr) =
8>><>>:
 cu2 z( c r )
(1 z2) +
z2cu
(1 z2)"
 cu2 z( c+r )
(1 z2) + z
cr zcu
(1 )(1 z2)"
if cr = c r
if cr = c+r
(41 )
where " =  (1  )  c
+
r  z( cu2)+zcu
z2(cu)
2+(cr)
2 2crzcucr 2 (0; ).
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With weak complementarity, i.e. z 2 (zc ; 0), we nd from (29) an upward
distortion of the quantity produced by the e¢ cient rm, while the output
of the ine¢ cient one is still below the complete information level. The idea
is that now the regulator prefers to increase the wedge between quantities,
since this relaxes the incentive constraint in (26). Notice from (29) that the
regulator induces an ex ante downward quantity distortion. Complementar-
ity implies an analogous impact on the unregulated production (see (32)),
which penalizes (in expected terms) the competitive a¢ liate.
The mechanism described by (29) through (32) is no longer feasible for
su¢ ciently close complements, i.e. z 2 ( 1; zc ).18 This occurs because the
e¢ cient rm would incur losses (the prot in (31) would be negative) and
then would not participate. The cut-o¤ value zc dened by (37) denotes the
highest level of complementarity which is compatible with positive prots.
When goods are close complements, the incentive constraint in (26) is so weak
that the regulator can extract all informational rents (see (40)). This does not
imply at all that the rms interests perfectly align with those of the regulator
and then the rst-best outcome can be achieved. Regulated quantities in (38)
- and corresponding prices in (39) - are qualitatively distorted as before to
ensure incentive compatibility ((26) is still binding at the optimum), and the
competitive subsidiary provides the output in (41).
6. Welfare comparisons
We are now in a position to state our main results.
Proposition 4 Under asymmetric information, if goods are substitutes the
regime of separation
(i) reduces expected informational rents
(ii) increases expected consumer surplus
(iii) increases expected social welfare.
If goods are complements, the regime of concentration yields (i) through
(iii).
The two regimes give the same amount of expected subsidies to the regu-
lated rm.
The rst period of Proposition 4 reveals that with substitutability the
pattern of consolidation exacerbates the monopolys incentives to exaggerate
costs. This strategy is protable both in the regulated segment, where the
18The interval ( 1; zc ) is nonempty, i.e.  (z) < 0 in (37), if cu is high enough (see
the Appendix for details).
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rm can gain from the usual mimicking behaviour, and in the unregulated
part of the market, since substitutability between goods implies an increase
in production (and prots) of the competitive subsidiary. Put di¤erently, cost
exaggeration yields a positive informational externality for the monopoly in
the unregulated market. This makes the incentive constraint in (26) more
severe than in (18). Taking the expected di¤erence between (31) and (22)
yields
E

Cr
  E Sr  = zcu (1 + 2)cr   (1 + ) zcu (1  z2) , (42)
which is positive for z 2 [0; zs ]. This means that the regime of consolidation
distributes higher (expected) informational rents. The more severe incen-
tive problem under consolidation yields higher allocative ine¢ ciency, which
reduces (expected) consumer surplus and social welfare. Separation clearly
performs better, since the monopoly neglects the impact of its choices on the
competitive segment, and this relaxes the regulators incentive problem. For
su¢ ciently high levels of substitutability, i.e. if z 2 (zs ; 1), the pattern of
consolidation is even less appealing, since the regulator cannot discriminate
between the rms types.
The second part of Proposition 4 shows that complementarity inverts the
sign of forces at work. The regime of consolidation now softens the regulators
critical control problem, since the internalization of the loss in the competi-
tive segment arising from cost manipulation weakens the monopolys incen-
tive to exaggerate costs. In other terms, consolidation creates countervailing
incentives which make the regulatory task of controlling cost exaggeration
less burdensome. The sign of (42) is now negative, which means that for
z 2 [zc ; 0) consolidation allows the regulator to reduce informational rents.
This improves allocative e¢ ciency, by making consumers and society better
o¤. With su¢ ciently high levels of complementarity, i.e. if z 2 ( 1; zc ), the
regulatory policy with consolidation is even able to capture all informational
rents of the rm.
Finally notice that the regulated monopoly receives the same (expected)
subsidy irrespective of the regime. The two relevant constraints in (18) and
(26) di¤er in a term which only depends on quantities, and then there is no
reason for providing di¤erent subsidies.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the design of the institutional pattern in a two-
product industry with interdependent demands where one good is subject to
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regulation and the other is provided in a competitive way. We have found
that the regime of separation improves (expected) social welfare when goods
are substitutes. This is because the regulated rm does not internalize the
gain from exaggerating costs in the competitive segment and then requires
lower informational rents. The opposite occurs in case of complementarity,
since a consolidated rm cares about the loss it imposes on the competitive
a¢ liate when manipulating its cost information, and then the pattern of
consolidation is less costly to implement.
We have also shown how the degree of product di¤erentiation crucially
a¤ects the features of the optimal regulatory policy. If goods are su¢ ciently
close substitutes, under consolidation the regulator can no longer discrimi-
nate between the rms types and it is forced to o¤er a bunching mechanism.
Conversely, for high levels of complementarity, the regulatory mechanism is
able to extract all informational rents of the rm.
Our results may also shed some light on merger policies. While the
welfare e¤ects of consolidations between rms in competitive industries are
well known in the literature, this analysis in environments where regulated
and competitive activities interact is a stimulating eld which needs further
reasearch. The interplay between competition and regulation may yield new
e¤ects of some interest.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Standard arguments imply that (17) and (18)
are binding at the optimum. Replacing these constraints into (15) we get the
following rst-order conditions
  c r   qr
 
c r
  z    c2u   qr  c r  = 0
(1  )   c+r   qr  c+r   z    c2u   qr  c+r   cr = 0,
which yield (20). Straightforward substitutions allow to nd (21) through
(23).
Proof of Lemma 2 The monopolys extra prot  (c+r ; c
 
r ) from cost
overstatement, that is, when claiming bcr = c+r instead of c r , amounts to

 
c+r ; c
 
r

= r
 
c+r ; c
 
r

+ u
 
c+r ; c
 
r
  r  c r   u  c r  . (43)
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We nd from (5) that r (c+r ; c
 
r ) = r (c
+
r ) + crqr (c
+
r ) = crqr (c
+
r ), since
declaring the actual costs implies zero prots when the complete information
policy is implemented (see (12)). Then, we can rewrite (43) as follows

 
c+r ; c
 
r

= crqr
 
c+r
 cu qu  qr  c r   qu  qr  c+r  , (44)
where the second addend arises from the second-stage Bertrand competition
(see (8)). Substituting (10) and (13) into (44) yields

 
c+r ; c
 
r

=

  c+r   z
 
  c2u

+zcu =
 
  c+r
 z    2c2u + c1u .
(45)
If z  0 then (45) is positive, since the term in square brackets is positive
(qr > 0 in (10)). If z < 0 we nd again  (c+r ; c
 
r ) > 0 for  > c
+
r and
 > 2c2u   c1u.19 Hence, the monopolist has an incentive to inate costs.
Following the same procedure, the monopolys extra prot  (c r ; c
+
r )
from cost understatement, that is, when declaring bcr = c r instead of c+r , is

 
c r ; c
+
r

= r
 
c r ; c
+
r

+ u
 
c r ; c
+
r
  r  c+r   u  c+r  . (46)
Since from (5) r (c r ; c
+
r ) = r (c
 
r )   crqr (c r ) =  crqr (c r ), replacing
(10) and (13) into (46) yields

 
c r ; c
+
r

=     c r   z    c2u  zcu
=      c r + z    2c2u + c1u :
As the term in square brackets is positive, for z  0 we have  (c r ; c+r ) < 0.
Notice from the second equality that the same conclusion applies if z < 0,
since  (c r ; c
+
r ) is the sum of two negative terms. This means that deating
costs is not protable.
19If rm 2s costs were large enough relative to rm 1s, then the latter could impose the
monopoly price, i.e. pmu =
1
2
 
+ c1u   qr

. However, this clashes with the assumption of
competition, since rm 2 would be completely irrelevant. Hence, we rule out the case of
monopoly pricing and assume pmu > c
2
u irrespective of the di¤erentiation between goods,
which implies  > 2c2u   c1u.
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Proof of Proposition 2 The Lagrangian function for the problem in
(15) under the constraints in (16), (17), (26) and (27) takes the following
form
L
 
qr
 
c r

; r
 
c r

; qr
 
c+r

; r
 
c+r

= 

qr
 
c r
  c r qr  c r   12q2r  c r 
+
1
2
 
  c2u   qr
 
c r
2   r  c r + (1  ) qr  c+r   c+r qr  c+r 
 1
2
q2r
 
c+r

+
1
2
 
  c2u   qr
 
c+r
2   r  c+r +r  c r +r  c+r 
+"

r
 
c r
  r  c+r  crqr  c+r   zcu  qr  c r   qr  c+r 
+

r
 
c+r
  r  c r +crqr  c r + zcu  qr  c r   qr  c+r  , (47)
where , , " and  are the (non-negative) Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated
respectively with (16), (17), (26) and (27). Optimizing (47) with respect
to qr (c r ), qr (c
+
r ), r (c
 
r ) and r (c
+
r ) yields after some manipulations the
following conditions
qr
 
c r

=
  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
zcu ("  )
 (1  z2) +
cr
 (1  z2) (48)
qr
 
c+r

=
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) +
zcu ("  )
(1  )  (1  z2) 
"cr
(1  )  (1  z2) (49)
+ " = +  > 0 (50)
+  = "+ (1  ) > 0, (51)
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where the last two inequalities ( 2 (0; 1)) imply that either (16) or (26)
(or both) and either (17) or (27) (or both) must be binding at the optimum
(by complementary slackness conditions). Notice that under substitutability
one participation constraint is binding in equilibrium. If no participation
constraint were binding, the regulator could increase social welfare by reduc-
ing r (c r ) and r (c
+
r ) by the same amount until one of them saturates, a
contradiction.20 If both of them were binding, then (26) would be violated.21
This discussion implies that we can restrict our attention on the following
four cases
(I)  > 0;  = 0; " > 0;  > 0
(II)  > 0;  = 0; " = 0;  > 0
(III)  = 0;  > 0; " > 0;  = 0
(IV)  = 0;  > 0; " > 0;  > 0.
We can immediately see that case I is impossible. In fact, ";  > 0 yields
from (26) and (27) qr (c r ) = qr (c
+
r ), which in turn implies r (c
 
r ) > 0 from
(26), a contradiction with  > 0. Case II cannot be a solution either, since
the binding (16) combined with (27) yields r (c+r ) < 0, which violates (17).
Hence, the regulator nds it optimal to implement the separating mechanism
which emerges in case III. This is shown in the rst period of Proposition
2 in the paper. To nd this result, optimize (15) subject to the binding
constraints (17) and (26). The rst-order conditions are
  c r   qr
 
c r
  z    c2u   qr  c r   zcu = 0
(1  )   c+r   qr  c+r   z    c2u   qr  c+r   (cr   zcu) = 0,
which immediately yield (29). Standard substitutions allow to derive (30)
through (32).
Notice that this solution is feasible as long as the monotonicity condition
in (28) is satised, i.e. if z 2 [0; zs ], where zs  crcu . Otherwise, case IV
applies, which yields the bunching outcome illustrated in the second period of
Proposition 2.22 To derive this solution, optimize (15) subject to the binding
constraints (17) and (28). The rst-order condition is


  c r   qr   z
 
  c2u   qr
 cr
20Summing (50) and (51) yields  +  = 1, which implies that at least one of the
corresponding constraints must be stringent.
21We will see that this may be no longer the case under complementarity.
22The solution in case III (when feasible) clearly dominates that in case IV, since in the
latter the additional constraint in (27) is relevant.
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+(1  )   c+r   qr   z    c2u   qr = 0,
which yields (33). Standard substitutions imply (34) through (36).
Proof of Proposition 3 Under complementarity, we may nd both
(16) and (17) to be binding. This implies that there are three other possible
cases to investigate:
(V)  > 0;  > 0; " > 0;  > 0
(VI)  > 0;  > 0; " = 0;  > 0
(VII)  > 0;  > 0; " > 0;  = 0.
It is immediate to see that case V (which implies all constraints bind-
ing) is impossible because (26) and (27) yield qr (c r ) = qr (c
+
r ), which in
turn implies r (c r ) > 0 using (17) and (26), and this contradicts  > 0.
Case VI can also be ruled out, since the binding (16), (17) and (27) yield
qr (c
+
r ) =
cr+zcu
zcu
qr (c
 
r ), which implies qr (c
+
r ) > qr (c
 
r ), a violation of the
monotonicity condition in (28). Let us consider now case VII. Notice that
this solution is implementable since the binding (16), (17) and (26) imply
qr (c
+
r ) =   zcucrzcu qr (c r ), i.e. qr (c+r ) < qr (c r ), which satises (28) and then
ensures that (27) is fullled.
Notice that the aforementioned case I is impossible even under comple-
mentarity. We consider now case II with z < 0. Using (51), (48) and (49)
can be rewritten as
qr
 
c r

=
  c r   z (  cu2)
 (1  z2) + 
 1cr + zcu
 (1  z2) (52)
qr
 
c+r

=
  c+r   z (  cu2)
 (1  z2)  
zcu
 (1  z2) , (53)
where  1 = 1

. Substituting (52) and (53) into the binding (27) yields after
some manipulations
r
 
c+r

=    c
 
r   z (  cu2) +  1 (cr + zcu)
 (1  z2) cr
 zcu
 
1 +  1

(cr + zcu)
 (1  z2) : (54)
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We claim that (54) is negative, which violates the c+r -rms participation
constraint in (17) and then case II cannot be a solution. To see this, rst
notice from (52) and (53) that the monotonicity condition in (28) implies
cr   zcu. Then, su¢ cient condition for (54) to be negative is that the
rst ratio is greater than the second ratio. This is the case since qr (c+r ) > 0
in (53).
Hence, we are left with cases III, IV and VII. The separating equilibrium
in case III is implementable as long Cr (c
 
r )  0 in (31), i.e.  (z)  0 in
(37).23 As  (0) > 0 (qCr (c
+
r ) > 0) and 
00
(z) =  2(1+)c2u
cr
< 0, then for
z < 0 there exists a unique value zc such that   0 if and only if z 2 [zc ; 0).
For z 2 ( 1; zc ), then Cr (c r ) < 0 and the separating solution in case III is
no longer feasible, as emphasized in Proposition 3 in the paper.
We claim that if case III is not feasible the regulator nds it optimal to
implement case VII. Replacing  = 0 in (48) and (49) yields (38) in Proposi-
tion 3. From (26) we nd after some manipulations the value for " 2 (0; )
(see 50)). The expressions (39) through (41) are derived from straightforward
substitutions.
To show that case VII outperforms case IV, we rst rewrite (15) as
E [W ] = E [(  cr) qr] + 1
2
E

q2u   q2r
  E [r]
=
 
  c+r

E [qr] + crqr
 
c r

+
1
2
h 
  c2u
2   2    c2uE [qr]   2   2E q2ri  E [r] ,
using (8). Hence, the expected di¤erence in social welfare E [W ] between
case VII and case IV is
E [W ] =
 
  c+r

E [qr] + crqr
 
c r

  1
2

2
 
  c2u

E [qr] +
 
2   2E q2r E [r] . (55)
23Notice that the monotonicity condition in (28) is always satised for z < 0.
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From (33) and (38) we nd after some manipulations
E [qr] =
v   "
 (1  z2)cr (56)
and
E

q2r

= 

  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
zcu"
 (1  z2) +
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)



  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
zcu"
 (1  z2)  
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)

+(1  )


  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
cr   zcu
(1  )  (1  z2)"+
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)



  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
cr   zcu
(1  )  (1  z2)" 
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)

.
(57)
Combining terms in (57) yields
E

q2r

= 2
  c+r   z (  c2u)
2 (1  z2)2 (   ")cr
+
(cr   zcu")2
2 (1  z2)2 +
(zcu  cr)2
(1  ) 2 (1  z2)2 "
2. (58)
Substituting (56) and (58) into (55) we get
E [W ] =
 
  c+r
 v   "
 (1  z2)cr + 
cr   " zcu
 (1  z2) cr
  1
2

2
 (  c2u) (v   ")
 (1  z2) cr +
 
2   2 2  c+r   z (  c2u)
2 (1  z2)2 (   ")cr
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+
(cr   zcu")2
2 (1  z2)2 +
(zcu  cr)2
(1  ) 2 (1  z2)2 "
2
#)
+
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) cr.
(59)
Manipulating terms in (59) yields
E [W ] = 
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) cr +
 (cr)
2
2 (1  z2)
 z
2 (cu)
2 +  (cr)
2   2crzcu
2 (1  )  (1  z2) "
2. (60)
If we replace " =  (1  )  c
+
r  z( cu2)+zcu
z2(cu)
2+(cr)
2 2crzcucr into (60) we get after
some computations
E [W ] =
cr
 (1  z2)
  c+r   z (  c2u)
z2 (cu)
2 +  (cr)
2   2crzcu

z2 (cu)
2 +  (cr)
2
 2crzcu   1
2
(1  )    c+r   z    c2ucr   (1  )crzcu
+
2c2r
2 (1  z2) z2 (cu)2 +  (cr)2   2crzcu (zcu  cr)2 . (61)
The expression in the rst square brackets in (61) is positive if and only if
z2 (cu)
2
cr
(1 + ) >
1
2
 
  c+r   z
 
  c2u

+(1 + 2) zcu cr. (62)
Condition (62) is satised if  (z) < 0 in (37), that is, when case III
cannot be implemented. This implies that the solution in case VII performes
better than that in case IV.
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Proof of Proposition 4 (substitutability) Substituting (1) and (3)
into (2) the expected di¤erence in consumer surplus E [CS] between con-
solidation and separation is after some manipulations
E [CS] =
1
2
E

q2r

+
1
2
E

q2u

+ E [qrqu] . (63)
Using (8), (63) reduces to
E [CS] =
 (1  z2)
2
E

q2r

. (64)
Consider z 2 [0; zs ]. Using (20) and (29), we nd after some computations
E [CS] =
 (1  z2)
2

  zcu
 (1  z2)

2
  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
zcu
 (1  z2)

+(1  ) zcu
 (1  z2)

2
  c+r   z (  c2u)  cr
 (1  z2) +
zcu
 (1  z2)

. (65)
Rearranging terms in (65) yields
E [CS] =
zcu
 (1  z2)

 cr + zcu
2
  cr + zcu
2

=
 (1 + ) zcu
 (1  z2)

 cr + zcu
2

. (66)
As z 2 [0; zs ], the term in square brackets in (66) is negative, which implies
E [CS] < 0, that is, the regime of separation increases expected consumer
surplus.
Using (5) we derive the expected subsidy di¤erence E [Sr] = E [r] 
E [(pr   cr) qr] between consolidation and separation. After some compu-
tations we nd
E [Sr] =
(1  ) zcu
 (1  z2)
 cr +   c+r   z    c2u  cr + zcu
+
zcu
 (1  z2)

(1 + 2)cr   zcu  
 
  c r

+ z
 
  c2u

= 0. (67)
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Expression (67) indicates that the two regimes give the monopoly the same
expected subsidy. As from (4) E [W ] = E [CS] E [Sr], then (66) and
(67) immediately imply that if z 2 [0; zs ] then E [W ] < 0, i.e. expected
social welfare is higher under separation.
Consider now z 2 (zs ; 1). From (20) and (33) we nd
E

q2r

= 
"
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)
2
 

  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)
2#
+(1  )
"
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)
2
 

  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
cr
 (1  z2)
2#
,
which becomes after some manipulations
E

q2r

=   (cr)
2
2 (1  z2)2 .
Using (64) we immediately get
E [CS] =   (cr)
2
2 (1  z2) < 0, (68)
which means that separation improves expected consumer surplus.
From (20), (21), (33) and (34) the expected subsidy di¤erence E [Sr] =
E [r] E [(pr   cr) qr] is equal to
E [Sr] = 

  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) cr  
  c+r   z (  c2u)  cr
 (1  z2) cr

   c
+
r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) cr+ 
  c+r   z (  c2u)  cr
 (1  z2) cr = 0, (69)
which indicates that expected subsidy does not change between the two
regimes. As from (4) E [W ] = E [CS] E [Sr], then (68) and (69) im-
mediately imply that E [W ] < 0, that is, expected social welfare is higher
under separation even for z 2 (zs ; 1).
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Proof of Proposition 4 (complementarity) Notice from (66) and
(67) that E [W ] > 0 for z < 0. Then, as long as the solution characterized
by (29) through (32) is feasible under complementarity, which occurs for
z 2 [zc ; 0), the regime of consolidation gives higher expected social welfare.
Consider now z 2 ( 1; zc ). Substituting (20) and (38) into (64) yields
E [CS] =
 (1  z2)
2

  zcu"
 (1  z2)

2
  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
zcu"
 (1  z2)

+(1  )

cr
 (1  z2) +
zcu  cr
(1  )  (1  z2)"



2
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
cr
 (1  z2) +
zcu  cr
(1  )  (1  z2)"

. (70)
Rearranging terms in (70), we get
E [CS] =
 (1  z2)
2

2
  c+r   z (  c2u)
2 (1  z2)2 (   ")cr   2
crzcu
2 (1  z2)2 "
+
z2 (cu)
2 "2
2 (1  z2)2   (1  )
 
2 (cr)
2
2 (1  z2)2  
(zcu  cr)2 "2
(1  )2 2 (1  z2)2
!#
. (71)
We rewrite (71) as follows
E [CS] = 
  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) cr 
  c+r   z (  c2u) + zcu
 (1  z2) cr"
+
z2 (cu)
2 +  (cr)
2   2zcucr
2 (1  )  (1  z2) "
2   (1  ) 
2 (cr)
2
2 (1  z2)
#
. (72)
As " =  (1  )  c
+
r  z( cu2)+zcu
z2(cu)
2+(cr)
2 2crzcucr, combining terms in (72) nally
yields
E [CS] = 
  c+r   z (  c2u)  cr
2 (1  z2) cr+ 
  c+r   z (  c2u)
2 (1  z2) cr
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   c
+
r   z (  c2u) + zcu
2 (1  z2) cr" > 0, (73)
since the rst ratio is positive (qSr (c
+
r ) > 0 in (20)) and the di¤erence between
the other two is also positive as " 2 (0; ). Hence, the regime of consolidation
improves expected consumer surplus.
Using (20), (21), (22), (38), (39) and (40), the expected subsidy di¤erence
E [Sr] = E [r] E [(pr   cr) qr] is after some manipulations
E [Sr] =  zcu

  c r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2)  
zcu"
 (1  z2)

"
+(zcu  cr)

  c+r   z (  c2u)
 (1  z2) +
zcu  cr
(1  )  (1  z2)

". (74)
Collecting terms in (74) yields
E [Sr] =   cr"
 (1  z2)

  c+r   z
 
  c2u

+ zcu

+
z2 (cu)
2 +  (cr)
2   2crzcu
 (1  )  (1  z2) "
2 = 0, (75)
using the value for ". The two regimes give the same expected subsidy. As
from (4) E [W ] = E [CS]   E [Sr], then (73) and (75) immediately
imply that E [W ] > 0, that is, expected social welfare is higher under
consolidation.
Quantity competition The type of competition in hand clearly does
not a¤ect the result of equivalence under complete information. Hence, we
focus our attention on the asymmetric information case. Using (6) and (7)
the second-stage quantity competition between rms 1 and 2 implies after
standard computations24
24We assume that the cost di¤erence is such that rm 2 nds it protable to produce.
Our results do not change qualitatively if rm 2 is so ine¢ cient that it prefers to stay out
of the market.
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q1u (qr) =
1
3
 
  c1u +cu   qr

(76)
q2u (qr) =
1
3
 
  c2u  cu   qr

. (77)
Without loss of generality under consolidation the monopoly owns rm 1,
whose prot is after some manipulations
1u =
1
9
 
  c1u +cu   qr
2
. (78)
Using (78) the incentive compatibility constraints in (24) and (25) become
respectively
r
 
c r
  r  c+r +crqr  c+r + z9  qr  c r   qr  c+r  (79)
r
 
c+r
  r  c r  crqr  c r   z9  qr  c r   qr  c+r  , (80)
where   2 (  c1u +cu)  qr (c+r )  qr (c r ) > 0 (as q1u (qr) > 0 in (75)).
Summing (79) and (80) yields the following monotonicity condition
qr
 
c r
  qr  c+r  , (81)
which is equal to (28).
As the regulatory maximization program under the two regimes only dif-
fers in the incentive compatibility constraints, using (81) it can be easily seen
that (79) is more severe (relaxed) than (18) under substitutability (comple-
mentarity), which implies that separation (consolidation) performs better.25
This corroborates our main results in Proposition 4 of the paper.
25Notice that (80) (and possibly (81)) cannot be the only binding constraint(s) at the
optimum. If this were the case, r (c+r )  0 would imply from (80) r (c r )  crqr (c r )+
z
9 (qr (c
 
r )  qr (c+r )). This condition is more severe than that arising when (79) is the only
relevant constraint (possibly with (81)) as r (c+r ) = 0, by making the regulator worse o¤.
Hence, if (80) is relevant, then (79) also binds, which means that (81) is stringent.
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